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gious speech be afforded no disparate treatment from
secular speech.
Linda M. Cecchin
1. Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1992).
2. Id. at 617 (citing Heffron v. Int'l. Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981)).
3. Id. (quoting Board of Educ. of Westside Community
Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)).
4. Id. at 618.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 619.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 620 (citing Widmar V. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981);
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953)).
9. Id. at 618.
10. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271.
11. 964 F.2d at 621.
Moore v. Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc.,
972 F.2d 939, 941 (8th Cir. 1992).
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Derrick D. Moore, a songwriter and
musician, filed a copyright infringement suit against
the defendants, Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., a
motion picture production company, MCA Records,
Inc, a record production company, and Antonio Reid
and Kenny Edmonds, two songwriters. The Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the defen-
dants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ruling that
although the district court erred in finding that
Moore's evidence was insufficient to show access to
his copyrighted song, they were correct in finding
that the plaintiff did not demonstrate substantial simi-
larity between his work and that of the defendants.
FACTS
During March, April, and May of 1989, the plain-
tiff, Moore, composed a song entitled "She Can't
Stand It." On March 22, 1989, Moore's agent, James
Selmer, delivered the instrumental version of the
uncompleted song to Cheryl Dickerson, MCA's
Director of Artists and Repertoire. At that meeting,
Dickerson said she liked the tape and wanted to keep
it so that her supervisor, Louil Silas, could listen to it.
Dickerson asked Selmer to send her the final version
of the song, which he did on May 11, 1989. Neither
Moore nor Selmer were ever contacted by Dickerson
subsequent to that meeting.
During February and March of 1989, defendant
Reid claims to have created a rhythm tract for a song
called "On My Own." On March 21, 1989, he claims
to have delivered this track to defendant Edmonds,
who on March 22 (the same day Selmer met with
Dickerson) began to create music to accompany
Reid's rhythm tract. On March 23, defendants Reid
and Edmonds composed lyrics for "On My Own." On
March 25, they had the completed song and trans-
ferred it to a master tape. On March 31, Reid and
Edmonds played "On My Own" over the phone to
Silas, with whom they had worked in the past. In
early April, Reid and Edmonds submitted a copy of
their song to the producers of the movie
"Ghostbusters II," who eventually used it as the
theme song for the movie in June of 1989 after chang-
ing the title to "On Our Own." The song was released
as a single in late May of 1989.
On June 6, 1989, the day Moore registered his
song with the United Stated Copyright Office, he noti-
fied Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. ("Columbia")
that it was infringing on his copyright through the use
of the song "On Our Own," a charge which Columbia
denied. On July 14, 1989, Moore brought an action
against the defendants in the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota' alleging infringe-
ment of his copyrighted song "She Can't Stand It."
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Moore argued, first, that the district court erred in
finding the evidence did not establish a reasonable
possibility that defendants Reid and Edmonds had
access to "She Can't Stand It" before they composed
"On My Own". Second, he claimed that the court
erred in finding no substantial similarity between the
two songs.
In the Eighth Circuit, copyright infringement is
established by demonstrating: 1) ownership of the
copyright, and 2) copying by the defendant.'
Ownership of the copyright by Moore was not in dis-
pute in this case. Because the second element could
not be proven directly, copying can be demonstrated
by showing: 1) that the alleged infringer had access to
the copyrighted work, and 2) that the works at issue
are substantially similar.5
The court first addressed the issue of access.
Access can be established by proving that the defen-
dants had an "opportunity to view or copy" the plain-
tiffs work." A bare possibility of access to the work is
not enough; a reasonable possibility of access must
exist.' A reasonable possibility of access can be
demonstrated under the "corporate receipt doctrine".6
This court, like other courts, recognizes that the cor-
porate receipt doctrine can apply if there is a relation-
ship between the intermediary and the alleged
infringer, even if the alleged infringer is not an
employee of the intermediary.7 Moore asserted that
sufficient facts were presented to the district court to
defeat the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
on the basis of access.
The appellate court agreed with Moore and con-
cluded that there was a reasonable possibility that
Reid and Edmonds heard "She Can't Stand It" before
composing "On My Own."8 Dickerson acquired a
copy of "She Can't Stand It" on the same day that
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Edmonds claims to have begun composing the music
to accompany Reid's rhythm tract. Dickerson was ini-
tially excited about Moore's song, saying she was
going to have her supervisor, Silas, listen to it, but
then inexplicably lost interest in it, never contacting
either Moore or Selmer about the possibility of a
recording contract. Dickerson, Silas, Reid and
Edmonds were all friends and had worked together in
the past. Silas encouraged Reid and Edmonds to sub-
mit a song for the "Ghostbusters II" soundtrack.
Applying the corporate receipt doctrine, the court
decided that although Reid and Edmonds were not
employees of MCA, Dickerson and Silas were in a
position to provide suggestions or comments to the
defendants regarding their work, and thereby con-
cluded that there was a reasonable possibility that
Reid and Edmonds had access to copy Moore's work.'
The court then addressed the issue of substantial
similarity. In order for the plaintiff to show substantial
similarity, he must demonstrate: 1) a substantial simi-
larity of the general ideas, and 2) a substantial similar-
ity of the expressions of those ideas.10 The court uti-
lizes the extrinsic test to decide upon the issue of sim-
ilarity of ideas. Using this test, the court decides
whether or not the details of the works contain objec-
tive similarities. If the court finds that objective simi-
larities do in fact exist between the copyrighted work
and the alleged infringing work, the court next uses
the intrinsic test to decide similarity of expression."
This test uses a reasonable person standard. " Under
the intrinsic test, the analysis is to decide whether or
not the works are so dissimilar that "ordinary, reason-
able minds [caninot differ as to the absence of sub-
stantial similarity in expression.'"" Expert testimony is
admissible in utilizing the extrinsic test to see if the
works contain objective similarities."4
The appellate court affirmed the lower court's
decision that the works were not substantially similar,
under the extrinsic test, in their ideas. The court
based this decision on affidavits submitted by the par-
ties. These affidavits, the court said, contained
convincing testimony by the defendants' expert wit-
nesses that the defendants' song, "On Our Own," and
Moore's song, "She Can't Stand It," were not substan-
tially similar. One defense witness, a producer/song-
writer, testified that the melody, harmony, bass and
accompaniment lines were "distinctly different" and
that the "pitches, rhythms and phrasing of the vocal
melodic lines are different virtually throughout [both
songs]"." Each of the defendants' experts testified that
any similarities between the songs were due to the fact
that both were from the genre of R & B/hip-hop music.
In a deposition, the plaintiffs expert witness testi-
fied first that "On Our Own" was copied from "She
Can't Stand It." However, upon later questioning, he
wavered and admitted that it was possible that "On
Our Own" was not copied from "She Can't Stand It."
This witness, the court found, was unfamiliar with the
genre of hip-hop music and was unable to musically
classify the two songs. Based on the strength and
depth of the defendants' expert testimony and on the
"inconclusive and unsubstantiated testimony" of the
plaintiffs expert, the court was convinced that under
the extrinsic test, a reasonable factfinder could not
find the two songs to be substantially similar. 6
CONCLUSION
Although Moore was able to demonstrate a rea-
sonable possibility that defendants Reid and Edmonds
had an opportunity to obtain access to his work, the
appellate court affirmed the district court's decision to
grant the defendants' request for summary judgment
because Moore was unable to show a substantial sim-
ilarity between the ideas underlying the two works.
Judge Lay, in partial dissent, felt the case should
have been remanded on the issue of substantial simi-
larity.17 In his opinion, the majority mistakenly
allowed defendants to offer expert testimony to refute
similarity of expression. Under Hartman v. Hallmark
Cards, Inc, expert testimony is applied to the extrin-
sic test for substantial similarity of ideas; while the
factfinder, the jury, applies a reasonable person stan-
dard to determine similarity of expression.'
Melissa Madigan
1. Plaintiff Derrick D. Moore was a resident of Minneapolis,
Minnesota.
2. Moore v. Colombia Pictures Industries, Inc., 972 F.2d
939, 941 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 111 S.Ct. 1282, 1296 (1991)); accord, Hartman v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987).
3. Moore, 972 F.2d at 941-942.
4. Id. at 942 (quoting Sid & Mary Krofft Television Prod.,
Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977)).
5. Id.
6. The corporate receipt doctrine states that "if the defen-
dant is a corporation, the fact that one employee of the corporation
has possession of the plaintiff's work should warrant a finding that
another employee (who composed defendant's work) had access to
plaintiff's work, where by reason of the physical propinquity
between the employees the latter has the opportunity to view the
work in the possession of the former*. Id.
7. Id. (citing Metra-Film Assoc., Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F.
Supp. 1346, 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1984); see also Ferguson v. Nat'l
Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978)).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 943. The court stated that case law in other circuits
and districts supported their holding on access. Id. at 944.
10. Id. at 945.
11. Expression is infringed when the "total concept and
feel" of the works are substantially similar. Hartman v. Hallmark
Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120-21 (8th Cir. 1987).
12. Moore, 972 F.2d at 945.
13. Id. (quoting Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1355-
56 (9th Cir. 1984).
14. id. at 945.
15. Id. at 946.
16. id.
17. Id. at 947.
18. Id. (citing Hartman, 833 F.2d at 120).
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